Regulatory theory insights into the past, present and future of general purpose water accounting standard setting by Chalmers, Keryn et al.
Deakin Research Online 
 
 
 This is the authors’ final peer reviewed (post print) version of the 
item published as: 
 
 
Chalmers, Keryn, Godfrey, Jayne M. and Lynch, Barbara 2012, Regulatory theory insights 
into the past, present and future of general purpose water accounting standard setting, 
Accounting, auditing and accountability journal, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 1001-1024. 
 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30048368 
 
 
 
 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner. 
 
 
 
Copyright : 2012, Emerald Group Publishing Limited 
 
 Regulatory theory insights into the past, present and 
future of general purpose water accounting standard 
setting 
      
The Authors 
Keryn Chalmers, Monash University, Caulfield East, Australia 
Jayne M. Godfrey, College of Business and Economics, Australian National University, 
Canberra, Australia 
Barbara Lynch, Deakin University, Warnambool, Australia 
Abstract 
Purpose – Accounting and water industry experts are developing general-purpose water 
accounting (GPWA) to report information about water and rights to water. The system has 
the potential to affect water policies, pricing and management, and investment and other 
decisions that are affected by GPWA report users' understanding of water risks faced by an 
entity. It may also affect financial returns to accounting and auditing firms and firms in water 
industries. In this paper the authors aim to examine the roles of the accounting profession, 
water industries and other stakeholders in governing GPWA. Recognising that the fate of 
GPWA depends partly upon regulatory power and economics, they seek to apply regulatory 
theories that explain financial accounting standards development to speculate about the 
national and international future of GPWA. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Official documents, internal Water Accounting Standards 
Board documents and unstructured interviews underpin the authors' analysis. 
 
Findings – The authors speculate about the benefits that might accrue to various stakeholder 
groups from capturing the GPWA standard-setting process. They also suggest that 
internationally, water industries may dominate early GPWA standards development in the 
public interest and that regulatory capture by accounting or water industry professionals will 
not necessarily conflict with public interest benefits. 
 
Practical implications – Accounting for water can affect allocations of environmental, 
economic, social and other resources; also, accounting and water industry professional 
standing and revenues. In this paper the authors identify factors influencing GPWA standards 
and standard-setting institutional arrangements, and thereby these resource allocations. The 
paper generates an awareness of GPWA's emergence and practical implications. 
 
Originality/value – This is an early study to investigate water accounting standard-setting 
regulatory influences and their impact. 
Keyword(s): 
Water accounting; Financial accounting; Regulatory theory; Public interest; Private interest; 
Regulatory capture; Accounting; Water; Water industry; Finance. 
1. Introduction 
Since 2007, Australia has been leading the world in the development of general purpose 
water accounting (GPWA)[1]. GPWA is designed to report information about water and 
rights to water to external parties who are otherwise unable to command that information 
from an entity, but who could be expected to need the information to make decisions about 
the allocation of resources (Water Accounting Standards Board, 2010). Those resources may 
include, but are not limited to, resources that are economic, environmental or social in nature. 
For example, decisions might relate to whether to invest in a company that has exposure to 
operational risk due to water scarcity or flooding, water quality, or variability of either 
(economic); policy regarding allocation of water to the environment (environmental); or 
whether to relocate communities due to water scarcity, flooding or quality (social). If GPWA 
is to provide input to decisions of this significance, it is important that the system provides 
information that is presented in a manner that enables it to fulfil its purpose[2]. 
The Water Accounting Standards Board (WASB), Australia's national water accounting 
standard setter, defines water accounting as “a systematic process of identifying, recognising, 
quantifying, reporting, and assuring information about water, the rights and other claims to 
that water, and the obligations against that water” (Water Accounting Standards Board, 
2009). In developing GPWA, the Board has drawn from financial accounting concepts, 
principles and practices (see www.bom.gov.au/water/standards). It has applied financial 
accounting methods of recording and reporting information to non-financial content: water 
volumes and quality, rather than financial values. Analogous to financial accounting's 
Statement of Cash Flows, Balance Sheet, and Income Statement are the GPWA Statement of 
Physical Flows of Water, Statement of Water Assets and Water Liabilities (introducing the 
notion of accruals because water assets include rights or claims to water as well as water 
itself), and the Statement of Changes in Water Assets and Water Liabilities (again, using an 
accrual concept). Together, these statements reveal how much water has been received into 
an entity (e.g. a catchment area, a mining company, a state or a water supplier) or left the 
entity and its source/destination[3]. They also reveal whether the water and rights to water 
held by an entity are currently sufficient to meet claims to water that the entity is obliged to 
honour. Finally, they reveal movements in both water and the rights to water. This 
information is likely to be useful in assessing risk associated with an entity by virtue of its 
association with water and rights or other claims to water (e.g. operating risk, environmental 
risk, or financial risk associated with water volumes, quality, or fluctuations in either). 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an ex ante analysis of the potential for regulatory 
theories to explain alternative possible national and international institutional arrangements 
for water accounting. We also consider the implications of those arrangements. We 
acknowledge that in the early development phase of a system such as GPWA it is unlikely 
that a single theory of regulation can explain all developments. Indeed, different theories 
might apply at different times. Given that GPWA has been derived from financial reporting, 
we examine the explanatory potential for three regulatory theories – public interest, private 
interest, and regulatory capture – that have been applied to explain regulatory developments 
in relation to financial accounting (e.g. Walker, 1987; Collett et al., 2001). While these 
theories can yield conflicting predictions, we suggest that this is not necessarily the case for 
GPWA. 
In this paper we speculate about potential influences on the development of GPWA. The 
importance of these influences derives from the importance of water, itself, as a resource of 
variable volume and quality. It also derives from the importance of GPWA reports to the 
decisions of future GPWA report users. Furthermore, it derives from the consequences of 
regulatory arrangements for the generation and distribution of GPWA-related revenue 
streams to accounting and/or water industry professionals. As an early study in relation to a 
new and developing reporting system, this paper is exploratory and speculative in nature. We 
hope that it will guide future research in ways that will contribute to the value of GPWA as 
an information system that facilitates effective and efficient resource allocations. 
Levels and variability of water quantity and quality are issues of major concern in many 
countries. In South Africa the issues involve water scarcity (Brulliard, 2009) and the toxicity 
of drinking water serving shanty towns and other low socio-economic communities (Bega, 
2009). Similar issues are demonstrated in parts of India (British Geological Survey, 2004) 
and South America (Goodman, 2009). In Spain, controversy has surrounded desalination 
plant construction to manage water scarcity (Keeley, 2008). United States (US) water policy 
has been described as fragmented with no real national water policy in place (Gerlak, 2005), 
and severe drought threatens agriculture production in China (Branigan, 2009). Likewise, 
during the first decade of the twenty-first century Australia experienced a drought which is 
thought to be one of the world's severest (Gleick, 2009). Subsequently, floods such as those 
occurring in Australia, Sri Lanka, Brazil and Indonesia during 2011 have demonstrated the 
need for information to plan for, or manage responses to, water abundance. 
As a consequence of drought issues facing Australia, an intergovernmental agreement on a 
National Water Initiative (NWI) was signed at the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG)[4] meeting in 2004[5]. The NWI is a plan for the management of water resources to 
optimise economic, social and environmental outcomes. Subsequently, the Australian 
Government approved the $AUD12.9 billion water investment program “Water for the 
Future”. This program aims to secure the long-term water supply for Australia. 
Recognising that sound water management requires high quality and credible information, the 
Australian government also earmarked $AUD450m of the water investment program for 
improving the quality, comparability and availability of water information. According to one 
of Australia's leading business commentators, the most powerful driver of Australia's raft of 
water reform initiatives since 2004 is likely to be information that will be provided through 
water accounting (Kohler, 2009). With these information improvements, parties involved in 
water resource planning and allocation should be better informed, leading to improved 
decisions. 
GPWA is being developed to provide decision-making information helpful to report users 
who are otherwise unable to command the information reported[6]. It is also expected to 
assist managers as well as external stakeholders. According to the WASB, the reports 
emanating from the application of GPWA standards will be general purpose water 
accounting reports. While GPWA derives from a conceptual framework aligned with 
conceptual frameworks underpinning financial reporting standards development, it is 
developing very differently in practice from financial accounting. Financial reporting 
standard-setters are retro-fitting incomplete conceptual frameworks to international and 
national accounting standards. In contrast, GPWA is developing in a staged logical sequence 
commencing with the completion of a Water Accounting Conceptual Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of General Purpose Water Accounting Reports (Water 
Accounting Standards Board, 2009) and moving to development of standards based on that 
conceptual framework. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we consider the nature of 
Australian water management issues and reforms and we summarise the development of 
GPWA. Our purpose is to identify some of the past, current and future pressures on the 
development of GPWA. Then in section 3 we discuss how public interest, private interest, 
and regulatory capture theories of regulation can explain GPWA standard-setting 
developments. We do so partly by drawing parallels with experience in relation to financial 
accounting since the three regulatory theories have been analysed to explain much of the 
development and acceptance of financial accounting at national and international levels (e.g. 
Walker, 1987; Collett et al., 2001). We contend that forces contributing to a regulatory 
capture of water accounting standard-setting will facilitate its global evolution and that this 
capture is likely to serve the public interest while also benefiting several significant 
regulatees. Furthermore, we consider measures that have been, and can be, taken to ensure 
high quality and credibility in water accounting standard-setting at national and international 
levels. We contend that the development of GPWA is unlikely to be dominated by a 
particular professional group given the multidisciplinary nature of the system. Section 4 
contains brief commentary on the potential for GPWA to be adopted internationally and the 
likely regulatory outcomes and their effects if, indeed, it is. We conclude the paper in section 
5 with a proposal for institutional arrangements to facilitate the role of GPWA 
internationally, if GPWA is to serve the public interest by providing high quality and credible 
information relevant to decisions affecting water resource planning, investment and 
allocation. We also propose avenues for future research. 
2. Water management reforms 
Until recently, each Australian jurisdiction[7] had its own particular approach to water 
management and reporting, with “no uniformity of language, structure, procedure or 
institutions” (Fisher, 2007, p. 115) nor data consistency (Bell and Quiggan, 2008). For many 
years these inconsistencies presented few difficulties. However, with population growth, 
drought and climate change, increasing pressure on water resources has led to a range of 
reforms, including institutional reforms, that have been initiated since 1995 (McKay, 2005). 
The problems have been particularly exacerbated by the fact that river systems cross State 
and Territory boundaries within Australia, and water distribution from those systems 
significantly disadvantage jurisdictions further from the source. 
In 1992, the COAG agreed there was a need for reform of the water industry, resulting in a 
signed agreement in 1994. Further reforms culminated in the 2004 signing of a new 
agreement, the NWI, a plan for national water reform, by all the Australian governments[8]. 
This was a significant milestone that provided the impetus for the current Australian systems 
of water management and water accounting. Figure 1 provides a chronology of some of the 
most recent significant steps in Australia's water reform program, commencing from when 
the NWI was signed. 
Subsequent to the signing of the NWI, an agenda was established to achieve a nationally 
compatible market, regulatory and planning based system of managing water resources that 
optimises economic, social and environmental outcomes. Furthermore, a National Water 
Commission (NWC) was established to assist with the NWI implementation. Key elements of 
the NWI include water resource accounting, best practice water pricing and water markets 
and trading (National Water Commission, 2008). 
With the express purpose of garnering public confidence in the management of water for 
economic, social and environmental purposes, the NWI requires the development and 
implementation of standards for systematically and consistently reporting information about 
water (Council of Australian Governments, 2004, para. 80-2). “Water accounting” is the term 
that has been coined nationally for this system, which should produce reports to underpin 
water management, trading and policy development. 
As a direct consequence of the NWI, Sinclair Knight Merz, an international engineering firm 
analysed Australia's existing water accounting practices to guide the development of 
standards and guidelines to underpin a national water accounting system. The report found 
that Australian water accounting was at “an immature phase[9] and being developed in an ad-
hoc fashion” (Sinclair Knight Merz, 2006, p. 1). Sinclair Knight Merz proposed the 
establishment of a Water Accounting Development Committee (WADC) to be the “prime 
decision making body for determining standards and guidelines” (Sinclair Knight Merz, 
2006, p. 226). 
Subsequently, the National Water Accounting Development project (NWADp) commenced 
at the direction of the Natural Resources Management Ministerial Council, and in 2007 the 
WADC was established to oversee this project. This committee was requested to begin the 
process to develop water accounting standards, develop a set of user information 
requirements and deliver demonstration water accounting reports. Presumably reflecting the 
formative nature of then-current thinking about the nature of water accounting, and also 
demonstrating political acumen, the WADC comprised a range of individuals with expertise 
ranging across irrigation, environmental protection, water management, water policy, 
hydrology, geology and financial accounting. The Committee was drawn from four states and 
one territory. Importantly, the Committee was supported by staff[10] with expertise in 
relation to water and who were managed by an individual with an accounting background. 
The WADC recognised the potential for a new form of water accounting which could be 
developed by drawing upon an existing mature discipline. It also recognised the benefits of a 
sound conceptual underpinning to the system to be developed. Therefore, the WADC 
commissioned the development of a water accounting conceptual framework by financial 
accounting academics[11]. These academics modelled the GPWA conceptual framework on 
the international Conceptual Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Statements as it existed at the time (International Accounting Standards Board, 2001). The 
GPWA conceptual framework (Water Accounting Conceptual Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of General Purpose Water Accounting Reports) was also 
completed to include components not yet incorporated in the financial reporting conceptual 
framework (e.g. measurement)[12]. The GPWA conceptual framework was subsequently 
approved by the WADC's successor, the WASB, in 2009[13]. It forms the basis for the 
Preliminary Australian Water Accounting Standard and its successor, Exposure Draft of 
Australian Water Accounting Standard 1 (ED AWAS 1) that were released for public 
comment by WASB in 2009 and 2010, respectively. ED AWAS 1 provides draft standards 
for the preparation and presentation of GPWA reports. 
Pilot projects have been an essential part of the NWADp. These pilot projects have field 
tested the conceptual framework as well as the requirements of the Preliminary Australian 
Water Accounting Standard within water industries. Findings from the pilot projects 
encouraged the WADC to continue developing GPWA using principles and analogies from 
the financial accounting discipline. With rapid and significant progress in GPWA standards 
developments, expertise beyond that available to the staff supporting the WADC and the 
WASB became necessary. This support has been provided by a Big 4 accounting firm with 
expertise in accounting standards development. 
At the same time that the WADC was being formed, work continued to progress legislation 
for the management of water resources in the Murray-Darling Basin[14], Australia's largest 
river catchment, as well as for other matters of national interest in relation to water and water 
information. The Commonwealth Water Act 2007 (Water Act 2007) was assented to on 3 
September 2007. Its catalyst appears to be a pre-federal election struggle to gain control over 
the Murray-Darling Basin in response to the water “crisis in the Murray-Darling Basin 
(which) demands that we deepen and accelerate reform” (Australian Government Department 
of the Environment and Water Resources, 2007 p. 15). The then Prime Minister of Australia 
argued that competing interests between the States were the core of the problem, with 
Commonwealth Government management being a potential solution (Crase and O'Keefe, 
2009). Amongst the key issues were inconsistencies between State and Territory reports on 
water flows, entitlements and allocations. Differences in reporting approaches meant that it 
was not possible to reconcile, for example, how much water one State reported as transferred 
to another, with the volume reported as having been received by the recipient State. 
Figure 2 shows the institutional arrangements relevant to GPWA development, regulation and 
governance prior to (Panel A), and subsequent to (Panel B), the Water Act 2007. 
Comparisons of Panel A and Panel B demonstrate transitions of responsibility and power in 
Australia's water information standardisation, generation and regulation. 
In March 2008, the COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water presented its 
report on the state of water reform. The report drew on contributions from Australian States 
and Territories as well as an updated assessment of the NWI prepared by the National Water 
Commission. In relation to GPWA, the report stated that there had been “strong national 
progress for delivery of water accounting objectives under the NWI” (Working Group on 
Climate Change and Water, 2008, p. 2). However, it acknowledged that the States would 
need to become more active in the roll-out of metering and accounting standards. The report 
proposed that the adoption of the national water accounting framework be accelerated. 
The Water Act 2007 commenced on 3 March 2008[15]. Its water management reforms 
include a transfer of responsibility for water accounting. Under the Water Act 2007, the 
Australian Bureau of Meteorology (BOM)[16] became responsible for: 
 issuing an annual National Water Account reporting on the nation's water resources 
and changes in those water resources; 
 developing Australian Water Accounting Standards for application by Australian 
water report entities; and 
 developing National Water Information Standards that govern the nature and quality 
of the data collected (e.g. water data measurement methods) (Natural Resource 
Management Ministerial Council, 2008). 
This allocation of responsibilities to the BOM is interesting given the BOM's previous 
independence from responsibility for water management or policy and its then general lack of 
skills in water accounting. However, it ensured the responsibility lay with a federal 
government body subject to high levels of public scrutiny and political accountability in 
relation to water. 
The BOM's water accounting functions now include the compilation of water accounts for 
Australia as well as issuing National Water Information Standards and Australian Water 
Accounting Standards. As such, the organisation with potentially the most nationally 
significant role as a water accounting regulatee is also the water accounting regulator. 
Whether the BOM is an actual regulatee depends upon whether it applies reporting standards 
to its own reporting. Its draft pilot of the National Water Account preface states that the BOM 
is attempting to apply water accounting practices that accord with the GPWA conceptual 
framework and the Preliminary Australian Water Accounting Standard (Bureau of 
Meteorology, 2010). However, that does not deny that the BOM can later choose another 
reporting approach, based upon an argument that the National Water Account is a specific 
purpose water account demanded by the Australian federal government, rather than a report 
whose preparation is governed by Australian Water Accounting Standards. 
In November 2008, responsibility for the NWADp transferred to the BOM and the WADC 
became advisory to the BOM. In April 2009, having assumed responsibility for setting water 
accounting standards, the BOM changed the membership, title and terms of reference of the 
WADC. At the time of writing, the WASB is an independent advisory board to the BOM and 
has responsibility for overseeing and co-ordinating water accounting standards development. 
The members of the WASB are now selected according to water or accounting standard-
setting expertise rather than any jurisdictional or stakeholder group affiliation. 
3. Application of regulatory theories to national GPWA developments 
Just as financial accounting standard-setting is politically influenced (Brown and Tarca, 
2001; Collett et al., 2001; McLeay et al., 2000; Godfrey and Langfield-Smith, 2005), GPWA 
developments have faced political challenges[17] and are likely to continue to do so. Also 
similar to financial accounting is the potential for GPWA standards to become international 
in nature. In this section of the paper we consider how changes in the Australian institutional 
arrangements for water accounting standard-setting may fit with particular theories of 
regulation. This, in turn, assists in predicting likely future pressures on water accounting 
standards development and assessing whether any action is required to ensure that GPWA 
serves its intended public service objective. We apply public interest, private interest, and 
regulatory capture theories of regulation and draw upon financial accounting development 
experiences to analyse the development of both financial reporting and GPWA institutional 
arrangements. While the focus is national, the implications are also international. Additional 
theories may be applied to predict GPWA standard-setting developments. However, we 
choose only public interest, private interest and regulatory capture theories to limit the scope 
of this study and because they have been applied successfully to explain developments in 
financial reporting, upon which GPWA is modelled. 
According to theories of regulation, regulation is a public good that arises because of 
government intervention that can be subject to different economic and political forces. Stigler 
(1971) describes two main alternative views on regulation of industry. Public interest theory 
regards regulation as a means of protecting the public from market failure. In contrast, under 
private interest theory, government intervention is seen as the result of the political power of 
interest groups who seek outcomes which benefit them; it is the means for transferring wealth 
to well-organised groups. Consistent with this theory, Watts and Zimmerman (1979) argue 
that, through its implications for wealth transfers and because of differing individual interests, 
government regulation creates incentives for lobbying on proposed accounting procedures. 
While it is often treated as a third theory of regulation, regulatory capture theory is a 
particular form of private interest theory. This theory assumes that although the purpose of 
regulation is to protect the public interest, this goal is not necessarily achieved because the 
regulatee controls or dominates the regulator and is able to assure that its private interest 
dominates the public interest. 
3.1 Public interest theory 
Typically, under public interest theory, regulation develops in response to a market failure 
crisis that is seen to be capable of resolution in the public interest. For example, government 
intervention in the financial accounting standard-setting process has been regarded as 
necessary because of failures in the market for accounting information. Similarly, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission was established in 1934 following the 1929 stock 
market crash; likewise, the Sarbanes-Oxley reform bill on accounting and corporate 
governance was passed in 2002 following the corporate scandals such as the collapse of 
Enron and the WorldCom earnings manipulation (Ijiri, 2005). In the UK, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales responded to criticism of the accounting 
profession, following what was regarded as misleading annual reporting, by establishing an 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee, later renamed the Accounting Standards 
Committee (Nobes and Parker, 2010). In Australia, market issues blamed on poor accounting 
standards and low levels of compliance with accounting standards promulgated by the 
accounting profession led to establishment of the Accounting Standards Review Board in 
1984 by the Australian Government[18]. This Board had the power to promulgate standards 
with the force of law. Similarly, world-wide calls for harmonisation of financial accounting 
to serve the public interest by increasing capital market efficiency, reducing the cost of 
capital for domestic firms listed internationally, and reducing the cost of national standard-
setting resulted in the rise of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to its 
current global dominance of private sector standard-setting (Collett et al., 2001). 
In Australia, Government initiation of the water accounting standard-setting process has been 
deemed necessary because of the critical importance of the resource during a (crisis) period 
of water scarcity, and because of issues related to water management. For example, some 
catchments have been heavily over-allocated to the point where the amount of water allocated 
for irrigation exceeds the sustainable capacity of the catchment (Bell and Quiggan, 2008). 
More particularly, there has been a public and government crisis of confidence in the quality 
and consistency of information provided by different States and Territories (Fisher, 2007; 
Gardner and Bowmer, 2007; Connell et al., 2005). Together with public concern for the 
environment and the integrity of water management by various jurisdictions, this has led to 
the series of reforms and developments, commencing with the NWI, that were described 
previously and summarised in Figure 1. Consistent with this analysis, McKay and Marsden 
(2009) comment that the increasingly unsustainable exploitation of water in Australia has led 
to institutional and legal reforms. Grafton and Peterson (2007) also state that Australian 
governments are acutely aware of the water management challenge as water becomes 
increasingly scarce. “Australia's worsening scarcity problem […] demands that we deepen 
and accelerate reform” (Australian Government Department of the Environment and Water 
Resources, 2007, p. 17). While the development of GPWA so far has occurred during a 
period of water scarcity, its usefulness does not necessarily diminish when decisions need to 
be made to plan for, or respond to, issues of water abundance. 
Water accounting standard-setting can serve the public interest because formalised water 
accounting can increase the quality and credibility of information available to external 
parties, and also to internal managers[19]. Consequential decisions should affect resource 
transfers (e.g. via water flows, sale of water rights, investment in water infrastructure or 
investment in water utility stocks), economic growth, and other outcomes such as 
environmental protection. This is achieved by increasing the relevance, representational 
faithfulness and comparability of water information to users. “Standardised water accounting 
is important, because it lets us know how much water there is, where it is, who is using it, and 
what it's being used for” (National Water Commission, 2009, p. 8). Public interest and public 
unrest gave rise to government intervention – to resolve a water shortage crisis and the crisis 
in confidence caused by failures in the market for information as States and Territories fought 
over the limited flows available from trans-border river systems and portrayed similar 
information differently under their different reporting approaches. 
Even if GPWA serves short-term public interests, this does not mean that it will necessarily 
continue to serve the public interest. Nor does it mean that the institutional arrangements for 
setting GPWA standards will remain constant or suitable. The initial institutional 
arrangements for water accounting standard-setting were subject to intense debate. With data 
collection about water already a responsibility of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and with 
the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation also heavily involved in 
water research and data collection, not all shared the vision that water accounting would 
develop as it has, nor that the National Water Commission or the BOM should be the body 
responsible for driving the NWADp[20]. 
The first phase of the reform of water accounting institutional arrangements took 
responsibility for water accounting away from the individual vested State and Territory 
jurisdictional interests and gave it to a specially-established body that worked closely with 
staff responsible for Australia's largest river system and basin, the Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority. This was possibly the best initial publicly and politically acceptable way to 
facilitate a public interest approach to setting water accounting standards. The acceptability 
came from two sources. The first is removal of the responsibility from individual jurisdictions 
that previously had been unable to develop a national, systematic and consistent approach to 
reporting water information of interest to policy makers, federal government, interest groups 
and the public. This constituted the market failure crisis that gave rise to calls for regulation 
in the public interest. The second is the allocation of responsibility to a Commission 
governing a multi-State and Territory catchment which was the subject of intense political 
concern and support because of a water scarcity and quality crisis affecting the catchment's 
economic, environmental, social and other effects on the majority of populated Australia. 
However, this was not an enduring arrangement. Water accounting responsibility is now the 
purview of the BOM. Unlike the Murray-Darling Basin Authority, the BOM does not have 
responsibility for managing water. It could be seen to be a credible, independent body under 
strong, relevant government control because of its current reporting lines to the Minister for 
Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities on matters relating to water 
information and lack of a vested interest in the outcomes of water management and other 
decisions based upon regulated water reports. 
Having been charged in 2007 with responsibility for providing the first annual National 
Water Account, the BOM has fostered the development of GPWA and its application to the 
National Water Account. At the time of writing, two senior employees of the BOM observe 
and contribute to most meetings of the WASB or its committees. It remains to be seen 
whether the current arrangement where the BOM has responsibility for setting Australian 
Water Accounting Standards, setting National Water Information Standards governing 
matters such as the methods of metering and other approaches to quantifying water volumes 
or quality, obtaining water information from various entities, and then applying GPWA 
standards to National Water Accounts, is an effective governance model. The continual 
development of GPWA once the BOM has achieved its own main water accounting goal, 
namely the preparation of the first National Water Account, will test the BOM's resolve and 
the commitment of Government That said, more independent, authoritative and committed 
alternative governance/regulation models have not been proposed, and the BOM is taking its 
role seriously in a manner consistent with public interest theory. 
3.2 Private interest theory 
In contrast to public interest theory, private interest theory predicts that those parties who are 
likely to be adversely affected by legislation exert political influence and lobby for outcomes 
that benefit them. The decision to lobby on a proposed financial accounting standard depends 
on a lobbyist's cost/benefit assessment and ultimately the effect of the accounting change on 
their interests (Brown and Tarca, 2001). For example, French banks vigorously opposed 
changes to International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition 
and Measurement in 2003 that could have induced volatility to their financial statements. 
Pressure, which included a written submission from the French President, resulted in the 
European Commission granting banks exemptions from particular requirements in IAS 39 
(Zeff, 2008). 
Applying private interest theory, those seeking to benefit from the BOM's control of water 
accounting standard-setting would lobby to influence the standard-setting process, if they 
considered that they stood to gain from lobbying. As Watts and Zimmerman (1979) explain, 
accounting procedures are a means of wealth transfer, and it follows that organisations 
expend resources to influence the accounting standard-setting process and secure a position 
that will enhance the organisation's wealth (or power or other private benefits)[21]. 
As such, it is not surprising that the last four years have seen lobbying for groups such as the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics[22] to be responsible for water accounting standard-setting. 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics has produced water accounts aligned with the System of 
Environmental-Economic Accounting for Water (SEEAW) for reporting the volume of water 
supplied and used in Australia since 1993. The Australian Bureau of Statistics can also be 
argued to have had a vested interest in promulgating the SEEAW approach rather than the 
development of a new system, as is occurring under the BOM's auspices. Other lobbyists 
include various jurisdictions, such as States or Territories, that have sought to maintain the 
systems they had in place before the national water project commenced. 
It is important to note that public and private interests do not necessarily yield contradictory 
outcomes. For example, one benefit that has been foreshadowed as deriving from 
systematised GPWA is the rationalisation of water reporting requirements in a similar fashion 
to a company producing one set of accounts using IFRS rather than multiple sets of accounts 
for listings in different countries that have different accounting standards and reporting 
requirements. Unstructured interviews with members of the WASB indicate that a reduction 
in the requirements to report information about water to multiple authorities and interest 
groups is seen by jurisdictional water managers as one very positive potential outcome of 
national GPWA standards and publication of reports[23]. Having to provide only one report 
each reporting period will provide relief to those report preparers who previously were 
required to produce multiple reports to satisfy an array of regulatory reporting 
responsibilities. However, there is a risk that the GPWA reported information will become 
only a subset of the information that would best serve public interests because individual 
parties lobby for exclusion of some reporting requirements. If this occurs, wealth and other 
resource transfers to private interests can result. 
The most obvious implication of private interest theory is that achieving “buy-in” from those 
required to produce GPWA reports is crucial to GPWA success. This buy-in might be 
achieved through involvement in water accounting standard-setting processes. For example, 
in the financial accounting standard-setting process, exposure drafts of proposed standards 
are issued for public comment with the intention of improving the final product and garnering 
support. However, there is potentially a trade-off between managing competing interests to 
achieve acceptance of the standards and having the standards achieve a general public good 
purpose. 
There have been numerous opportunities, through the development of water accounting 
reform, to facilitate private interest endorsement. This is consistent with public interest 
theory, but also with public interest rhetoric and actions that cloak private interest regulatory 
motivation. The original WADC composition sought buy-in from most jurisdictions and 
interest groups with its broad cross-section of skills and interests and State and Territory 
representation. The current standard-setting process has sought jurisdiction support through 
pilot projects during different stages of development of the GPWA conceptual framework, 
the Preliminary Australian Water Accounting Standard and ED AWAS 1. These pilot 
projects involve organisations whose different characteristics are likely to affect their 
technical application of GPWA and their acceptance of the approach. Public feedback has 
also been sought on the Preliminary Australian Water Accounting Standard and its successor 
exposure draft. This will assist in the refinement and development of the first Australian 
Water Accounting Standard, which is expected to be published in 2012. In order to inform 
and educate parties with vested interests in the outcomes of water accounting standard-
setting, in 2009 and 2010 the WASB also conducted a series of state and territory roundtable 
meetings with stakeholders likely to be affected by national GPWA standards. Similarly, 
Australian accounting and auditing and assurance standard-setting bodies have been kept 
informed and consulted regarding those aspects of water accounting standard-setting that are 
likely to concern them. 
In the context of water accounting, it can be argued that the greatest evidence of private 
interest would be: 
 individual jurisdictions lobbying for adoption of systems they already apply in order 
to minimize costs such as systems, development, implementation and training costs; 
and 
 private interests lobbying for reduced reporting requirements. 
The first of these was very evident in the early stages of developing GPWA[24]. The States 
that had the most sophisticated jurisdictional systems in place were the most vocal lobbyists 
against the development of a national system that differs from theirs. These are also the States 
that have been subject to the most debate and criticism regarding overuse of water, and 
breaching of water allocation entitlements (Roberts, 2008). The second has been evident in 
stakeholder roundtable meetings involving future GPWA report users and preparers and 
WASB members. 
3.3 Regulatory capture theory 
Regulatory capture theory is a specific form of private interest theory whereby the private 
interest that dominates is the interest of a party, or parties, whose behaviour is regulated. It 
assumes that although the stated purpose of regulation may be to protect the public interest, 
the regulatee is able to ensure that the their private interest dominates the public interest 
(Peltzman, 1976). Regulatory capture is widespread and takes a variety of forms. Much 
evidence of regulatory capture has occurred in industries such as medicine, mining and 
finance. It has also been argued to be evident in the water sector, both in Australia and 
internationally[25]. 
As an example of regulatory capture in the financial reporting domain, Walker (1987) asserts 
that the Australian Standards Review Board was captured by the interest groups it was 
established to regulate. The Australian Government originally established the Australian 
Standards Review Board as an independent body for protection of the public interest amid 
concern over low levels of compliance by accountants with the accountancy profession's 
standards. One role of this Board was to approve legally enforceable accounting standards 
that could originate from any source. However, Walker argues that the Australian Standards 
Review Board was successfully captured by the accounting profession, whose members were 
required to comply with the standards produced by the Board. In its short life of less than a 
decade, only one accounting standard was ever sourced from outside the accounting 
profession. 
More globally and more recently, many have observed that the extractive industries captured 
the international accounting standard-setting process and secured favourable outcomes from 
the IASB. It has been contended that extractive industry influence has resulted in IFRS 6 
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources achieving little in constraining varied 
accounting practice (Cortese et al., 2010). Observations that the IASB's accounting standard-
setting process has the potential to be captured by powerful interest groups are consistent 
with concerns about the pressure applied to the IASB in relation to amending IAS 39 during 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (Deloitte, 2008). The outfall of the GFC provided a 
catalyst for accounting standards to be blamed for the crisis and lobbying by constituents 
resulted in the IASB changing IAS 39 to permit reclassifications of financial assets under 
certain circumstances, thereby aligning IAS 39 with US GAAP. In doing so, the IASB broke 
its consultation principles in allowing a particularly powerful private interest to influence its 
standard. Mary Schapiro, president of the Securities Exchange Commission, later cited this 
lack of freedom from political interference as a reason for the USA to delay IFRSs reporting 
(Veron, 2009). Subsequently, the IASB has decided to comprehensively revise IAS 39 in 
coordination with the FASB, rather than make piecemeal amendments. 
While the FASB has agreed to work toward IFRS convergence, this provides significant 
incentives for it, as an effective regulatee, to capture the international standard-setting 
process. It is not surprising, then, that US dominance of membership representation on all 
four IASB committees has been suggested to compromise independence (Brown, 2008). 
Another means of influence is the provision of resources to the IASB (Wagenhofer, 2009). 
Financial resources provided by the extractive industries to the IASB have been argued to 
benefit those industries, for example (Noel et al., 2010). Together, the arguments reflect a 
view that resources – human and financial – can influence the dynamics and outcomes of 
international accounting regulation. This is consistent with theories that regulatory networks 
influence accounting and auditing standards, and that these networks can be influenced 
significantly by regulated individuals and groups with particular agendas (Richardson, 2009). 
While the BOM is the Australian national water accounting regulator with responsibility for 
the development and issuing of water accounting standards, it is also a regulatee since the 
Water Act 2007 legislates that it must produce a National Water Account for Australia from 
2010, and the BOM has stated its intention to apply GPWA in accordance with the Australian 
Water Accounting Standards when it does so (Bureau of Meteorology, 2010). Subsequent to 
passage of the Water Act 2007, the BOM no doubt has strong incentives, as a regulatee, to 
ensure that reporting requirements are not too onerous for it to apply in preparing the 
National Water Account. It simultaneously has incentives to ensure that standards are 
sufficiently specific and rigorous to guarantee that when the BOM directs the nature of 
information to be sourced from jurisdictions and other entities to prepare the National Water 
Account, the information will be suitable and of a high quality. 
These apparently contradictory incentives, however, can be reconciled within the GPWA 
conceptual framework that underpins the development of future water accounting standards. 
This framework focuses upon the preparation and presentation of GPWA reports to provide 
information to users who do not have the ability to command the preparation of water 
accounting reports designed specifically for their needs. There is a legal requirement to 
provide a National Water Account, but the users of the National Water Account are not 
specified in the Water Act 2007. Hence, the BOM could argue that the water accounting 
requirements that regulate it relate to specific purpose water accounting reports, whereas the 
BOM regulates standards for general purpose water accounting reports. Mitigating any abuse 
of this semantic opportunity is the fact that blatant attempts to exploit the reporting 
requirement anomaly could instigate a take-over for water accounting standard-setting by 
either the accounting profession or the water industry sector. 
Regulatory capture theory also suggests that the accounting profession has incentives to 
capture the standard-setting process since the profession could feasibly be required to 
prepare, audit and assure GPWA reports in the future. Even from a purely private interest 
theory perspective (rather than regulatory capture perspective), the accounting profession has 
incentives to lobby in relation to water accounting standards and to dominate their 
development. The financial gains from capturing the reporting and auditing and assurance 
requirements and ensuring that they are very closely aligned to those that already exist in 
relation to financial reporting could be significant. Given that water accounting draws upon 
financial accounting, water accounting skills and expertise could be acquired rapidly by 
members of the accounting profession to reap the reputational and financial benefits of 
industry specialisation by auditing firms (Craswell et al., 1995; Cahan et al., 2008). 
The national or international uptake of any water accounting system is likely to depend upon 
the system's effectiveness in providing useful information, and its feasibility as a system in 
the context of different countries' socio-political, legal, financial reporting and other 
information systems, and their capacity to collect and manage the required data. It is also 
likely to depend upon the potential to educate water report preparers and their information 
providers to build capacity for water accounting. In this regard, the accounting profession's 
engagement is vital to water sector buy-in and skilling in GPWA. It is likely to become a 
lucrative area for training and advisory services as well as for ongoing service provision by 
accountants with knowledge of water industries. 
The AASB has been informed of the WADC's work and then of its successor, the WASB, 
from the time that the WADC was established. Acknowledging that there is potential overlap 
of the domain of the accounting and water accounting standard-setters, the AASB has 
maintained a watching brief. Furthermore, in 2011 the WASB will work closely with the 
(Australian) Auditing and Assurance Standards Board to produce ED AWAS 2, relating to 
the audit and assurance of GPWA reports. This cooperation recognises the interdependence 
of water-related, accounting and auditing disciplines in the preparation of GPWA reports. At 
the time of writing, while there is agreement that ED AWAS 2 should be prepared through 
co-operative efforts, it has not been determined whether the final product will be a standard 
of the WASB, the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, or a joint standard. 
The other industry sector with potential regulatory capture interests in dominating water 
accounting standard-setting is the water industry sector. Ultimately, the information that is 
sourced for water accounts is information that can best be acquired from those with in-depth 
water knowledge. Those in the water industries who provide water information to the BOM 
to prepare the National Water Account, and who are also likely to prepare GPWA reports 
have a vested interest in ensuring that they are not subject to onerous water accounting 
standards. On the other hand, those consulting to the water industries to apply their 
significant expertise in water measurement could well be motivated to ensure that water 
accounting standards are sufficiently complex and rigorous to increase the demand for their 
skills. As with the accounting industry, water industry professionals also have potential to 
earn professional kudos and revenues from training and advisory services. Thus, there are 
incentives for either class of professional to attempt to capture the process to ensure their 
revenue streams as well as their reputational status and ability to contribute significantly to 
the emerging water accounting discipline. The potential for one professional group to 
dominate the process is limited by the multidisciplinary nature of GPWA which requires 
knowledge of the water industry and understanding of accounting systems. 
Regardless of discipline-specific interests, the fact that GPWA has developed in the absence 
of any universally accepted method of water accounting means that its standardisation and 
adoption are likely to proceed more smoothly than the globalisation of IFRS. This is because 
of the absence of vested interests in existing water accounting systems combined with the 
pre-existence of a GPWA conceptual framework. 
In summary, there are several potential regulatees of GPWA standards. The BOM, as one 
potential regulatee, has incentives to produce standards that are directed to ensuring that 
entities reporting to it provide high quality and clearly prescribed information required by the 
BOM to produce the National Water Account. However, the BOM also has incentives to 
produce GPWA standards, that are not onerous it to implement. There are reputational and 
financial incentives for water-related disciplines to capture the process and ensure that the 
standards are technically challenging in ways that promote the kudos of the water-related 
disciplines and the role of water professionals in measuring, recording, reporting and auditing 
GPWA reports. If this occurs, much of the lessons from centuries of financial accounting 
practice potentially will not be brought to bear in developing standards, and the process is 
unlikely to be efficient. There are also reputational and financial incentives for the accounting 
profession to capture the process and adapt financial reporting and auditing and assurance 
standards to a water context. The accounting profession would be motivated to ensure that the 
standards were challenging in ways that promote the kudos of the accounting and auditing 
disciplines and the role of accounting professionals in recording, reporting and auditing 
GPWA reports. Presumably, this would involve focusing upon technical recording and 
communication issues rather than technical content regarding water, or confining technical 
content to a limited number of disclosures or notes. If this occurs, a lack of technical 
expertise in relation to water modelling and estimation, for example, could affect the 
potential to develop standards that are effective in communicating water information relevant 
to assessing water risks and thereby informing decision-making. 
It is too early to know exactly how GPWA will evolve. However, there are very real 
opportunities for private interests, including those of regulatees, to play a part in that 
development, and also for regulatory theory to explain the likely outcomes. 
4. International developments: a comment 
There is international interest in GPWA. While other systems labelled “water accounting” 
exist, none matches the general purpose approach of the Australian system. For example, the 
SEEAW system developed by the United Nations reports statistics in a manner aligned to 
macro-level national accounts regarding balance of payments. This contrasts with the 
business-style reporting of transactions, transformations and events relating to a particular 
entity under GPWA. SEEAW's primary function is to provide data for analysis. Other 
systems trace water footprints: the movement of water, globally, as it is used in production 
and products are moved around the world (Hoekstra et al., 2009). The International Water 
Management Institute has also developed a system to provide information on the supply and 
use of water and relate water use to the economy (Molden et al., 2001). This system is similar 
to GPWA except that it does not account for water rights and obligations. 
Trial preparations of GPWA reports in Africa and Europe have been driven by members of 
water-related industries in these continents, in conjunction with individuals involved in 
developing GPWA standards. Discussions with authorities in the European Union, at the 
World Meteorological Organisation, the United Nations, and a range of other significant 
international water management or water policy organisations indicate a strong interest in 
GPWA. Meanwhile, some members of the IASB have maintained an awareness of GPWA 
standards development. It is also noteworthy that financial accounting academics and water 
industry policy developers and advisers from around the globe met in Europe in 2010 to 
discuss the role that water accounting can play internationally. Their discussions are likely to 
underpin recommendations for the development of an institutional framework for the setting 
of international water accounting standards. 
The greatest international interest in GPWA has been expressed by people involved in water 
policy development or water management; the accounting profession has maintained a more 
distant, watching brief. That was also true, nationally, during the early stages of Australia's 
GPWA development. The accounting profession subsequently became more influential by 
virtue of the need for both accounting and standard-setting expertise to contribute to the 
content and nature of the standards. Accounting firms have also recognised the potential to 
develop a new revenue stream should water accounting become more generally adopted. The 
role of the accounting profession will increase even further in Australia as a standard is 
developed in relation to the audit and assurance of GPWA reports. The expertise developed 
within Australian accounting firms would easily transfer internationally by virtue of the 
global nature of some of the large accounting firms. 
Internationally, we posit that a similar sequencing of water industries' and the accounting 
profession's engagement in GPWA standard-setting is likely. Discussions in the international 
arena are currently concentrated amongst water industry professionals, policy advisers and 
managers. The accounting profession will almost certainly become more involved in a multi-
disciplinary approach as it becomes apparent that accounting skills are required to implement 
a water accounting system that parallels the (inter)national financial accounting system in 
significant ways. The accounting profession's involvement is likely to increase markedly as 
awareness increases of the opportunities to shape a system to which accountants will 
contribute and by which accountants may be regulated; and opportunities to generate 
revenues in a new niche accounting market. 
What have not been established are the appropriate institutional arrangements given that, 
internationally, there many differences relating to water issues and their management; 
information systems quality; water management skills; and financial reporting skills. At a 
more political level, there exists a vast range of abilities to fund standard-setting; and to 
cooperate with other nations. Furthermore, some countries may have much to lose from 
transparent reporting of their water sourcing and use. As water accounting moves 
increasingly into the international domain, the politics relating to it will undoubtedly become 
significant. 
5. Conclusion 
The lessons learned from Australia's experience in developing GPWA are both national and 
international. A governance structure whereby the organisation responsible for developing 
water accounting standards is also responsible for implementing them and developing the 
related auditing and assurance framework works at present, but has yet to face serious 
challenge. Nationally, it will be interesting to see how GPWA standard-setting progresses 
once the BOM has produced its first audited National Water Account. 
Competition between parties in water industries and accounting could force a water 
accounting standard-setting equilibrium that resides within either industry sector. 
Alternatively, the Australian federal government could create an independent organisation, 
with no requirements to report under water accounting standards, to take responsibility for 
water accounting. The status quo provides an example of regulatory capture that – at least in 
the initial stages – has also so far fitted well with the public interest theory of regulation. Sole 
water industry or sole accounting industry responsibility for setting water accounting 
standards would be an example of regulatory capture which risks losing the 
multidisciplinarity that is a strong positive feature of the current arrangements. These corner 
solutions may also disenfranchise the other industry regulatee to the detriment of the future of 
GPWA if it does not have bipartisan support. 
Internationally, powerful players such as the EU and the FASB have demonstrated their 
influence over the IASB's standard-setting process. As the IASB's activities have become 
more far-reaching, political pressure has increased. Similarly, the water accounting standard-
setting process in Australia, and internationally, has the potential to be influenced by 
powerful stakeholders with strong vested interests in the reporting and policy outcomes. 
We are of the view that an organisation funded independently of either water or accounting 
interests and that draws upon skills from the water and financial accounting sectors but does 
not have responsibility also for the preparation of GPWA reports or their enforcement 
provides the greatest potential to serve the public interest. As long as it continues to describe 
the National Water Account as a specific purpose water account, the BOM can be argued to 
meet this description. An institutional framework for setting internationally accepted water 
accounting standards has yet to be developed. The politics surrounding this next step are 
significant, with national jurisdictional financial, property rights and political as well as 
disciplinary interests at stake. 
This paper describes GPWA national governance arrangements. Drawing from financial 
accounting experiences, it also provides an ex ante analysis of the potential for regulatory 
theories to explain future national and international developments and their repercussions. 
Future research opportunities include ex post analysis of the influences affecting GPWA 
development and governance. They also include assessing the implications of GPWA and its 
governance, during periods of both water scarcity and abundance, for reporting practices; the 
development of water modelling and measurement technology; and distributions of revenues 
between financial accounting and water-related disciplines. In combination, ex ante and ex 
post analyses can inform national and international institutional arrangements as they 
develop. They can also raise understanding of GPWA, its evolution and potential. In turn, this 
will affect the nature of the system and its ability to serve its general purpose decision-
usefulness approach. Ultimately, resource allocations will be affected: both to the various 
parties involved in GPWA development, and by those parties using GPWA reports. 
 
Figure 1Chronology: Australia's water accounting developments 
 
Figure 2Institutional arrangements for the development of water accounting in Australia 
Notes 
1. For further information about GPWA and related institutional arrangements see 
www.bom.gov.au/water/standards/aboutWASB.shtml, Chalmers et al. (2009a, b) and 
Slattery (2008). 
2. The WASB has approved a conceptual framework that lists qualitative characteristics 
to ensure the usefulness of GPWA reports as relevance, faithful representation, 
completeness, neutrality, freedom from material error, comparability, verifiability, 
timeliness and understandability (Water Accounting Standards Board, 2009). 
3. The definition of a water report entity for which GPWA reports should be prepared is 
“a water entity in respect of which it is reasonable to expect the existence of users 
who depend on general purpose water accounting reports for information about water, 
or rights or other claims to water, which will be useful to them for making and 
evaluating decisions about the allocation of resources” (Water Accounting Standards 
Board, 2010). 
4. COAG's role is to initiate, develop and monitor the implementation of policy reforms 
of national significance and which require cooperation by Australian governments 
(Council of Australian Governments, 2008). 
5. This agreement built on the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework. 
6. These users are likely to fall into a broad range of categories including water users, 
investors in water dependent entities, government representatives and their advisers, 
water industry regulators and consultants, water managers, academics and interested 
citizens (Water Accounting Standards Board, 2009). 
7. Australia is a federation of six States and two Territories. Within and crossing their 
borders are several significant water basins such as the Murray-Darling Basin. 
8. Responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the NWI lies with the Natural 
Resource Management Ministerial Council with support from the National Water 
Commission. The Ministerial Council consists of the Australian and New Zealand 
government ministers responsible for primary industries, natural resources, 
environment and water policy. The National Water Commission is an independent 
statutory body, reporting directly to the Minister for Sustainability, Environment, 
Water, Population and Communities. 
9. While information on water resources has been compiled in Australia since the mid-
1960s (Vardon et al., 2007), no single water accounting system has been applied 
consistently throughout Australia. 
10. The Water Accounting Development Committee Office supported the WADC. The 
WASB is now supported by the Water Accounting Standards Board Office located 
within the BOM. 
11. The academics who completed the draft water accounting conceptual framework are 
Professor Keryn Chalmers, Professor Jayne Godfrey and Associate Professor Brad 
Potter. 
12. Unlike financial reporting, the conceptual framework underpinning GPWA includes 
concepts relating to measurement, disclosure, compliance and assurance. This 
conceptual framework also covers the objective of GPWA reports, qualitative 
characteristics of the reports, and the definition and recognition criteria for the 
elements of the reports that are analogous to the concepts covered in the financial 
reporting Framework (Water Accounting Standards Board, 2009). 
13. For information regarding the WADC and its successor, the WASB, see 
www.bom.gov.au/water/wasb 
14. Prior to the Water Act 2007, management of the Murray-Darling Basin was 
undertaken by five Australian States and Territories. The Water Act 2007 allows 
water resources in the Murray-Darling Basin to be managed at a national level. 
15. The Water Act 2007 was later amended by the Water Amendment Act 2008. 
16. The BOM is a prescribed agency and reports to the Minister for Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Population and Communities. 
17. These challenges may be even more acute than those associated with financial 
accounting because of the greater uncertainties and measurement problems associated 
with water. 
18. The Accounting Standards Review Board replaced the Australian Accounting 
Research Foundation following proposals for greater government and community 
involvement in the development of accounting rules. The role of the Accounting 
Standards Review Board was to approve accounting standards and give them legal 
backing, leading to improved reporting. 
19. In unstructured interviews, managers of organisations that have piloted GPWA have 
all commented that they learned information about their own organisations in the 
process, and that the exercise was useful for management as well as in providing 
information for the intended external users of general purpose water accounting 
reports. 
20. These organisations have different reporting lines. As previously discussed, the BOM 
is a prescribed agency and reports to the Minister for Sustainability, Environment, 
Water, Population and Communities. The Australian Statistics Advisory Council is 
the key advisory body to the Minister (Assistant Treasurer) and the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics on statistical services. It provides valuable input to the directions and 
priorities of the Australian Bureau of Statistics' work program and reports annually to 
Parliament. CSIRO is an Australian Government statutory authority accountable to 
the Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research. 
21. If the BOM or its Director, were to be the beneficiary, their gain would be derived 
from: political profile, power and leverage associated with control over regulation 
relating to a high profile issue of critical national importance; access to the funding 
that the federal government allocated to water accounting standard-setting; or 
potential control over the standards which it chooses to apply, and which it enforces. 
22. The Deputy Australian Statistician from the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2005 
was quoted as saying that water accounting is a high organisational priority and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics could produce an annual report given greater resources 
(PALM Consulting Group, 2005, p. 3). 
23. All interviews undertaken in this study are unstructured and occur as frequent 
discussions with WASB members and less frequent, but multiple discussions with 
managers of organisations that have piloted GPWA. They occurred over the period 
2007-2010. The interviews were casual and unstructured in nature in order to develop 
rapport and to elicit information that might not be forthcoming in the context of 
structured interviews. 
24. The academics who developed the water accounting conceptual framework and 
WASB members report that this behaviour was evident in focus group sessions and in 
meetings between members of the WASB and those involved in developing or 
applying existing jurisdictional approaches to water accounting. 
25. See, for example, Herath's (2002) argument that the Franklin Dam in Tasmania was 
flooded for the purpose of electricity generation and Etzioni's (2009) discussion of 
mining companies successfully lobbying to dismantle restrictions on waste dumping 
in rivers. 
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